Monday, 5 March 2018



The oil rent and the economic crisis in Venezuela

By Blas Regnault regnault@iss.nl [1]
March 2018

The Venezuelan economy is experiencing a very complex crisis. Common sense invites us to draw hasty conclusions, explaining the problem trough the so-called resource curse. In my opinion, the oil rent is neither a blessing nor a curse. The oil rent is just a peculiar income that deserves a different conception into the national accounts in order to understand the performance of these oil-exporting economies. Deconstructing the “curse” argument and taking into account some peculiar aspects of the global oil business can give us initial answers to understand the Venezuelan crisis.

What is the oil rent? What is the oil price? The oil rent is a fluctuating income, linked to the global productivity of the oil wells in the world market (Differential Rent or Ricardian Rent). In nowadays, the global productivity of oil wells is due to the traditional natural conditions and to the emergency of new technologies, such as “Shale Oil” in US. Thus, the price of a barrel, after pay wages and profits, depends on the production cost of the least productive well, creating a differential of costs that the most productive regions have taken advantage.

Oil rent at stake. Thus, the oil rent is a widely accepted, inevitable and a specific remuneration into the oil business. In historical terms, National Oil Companies (NOC), Major Oil Companies (MOC), oil national states and private owner (only in US) have been fighting to taking advantage of the oil rent. In Texas, Alaska, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Norway, UK, Nigeria or Venezuela the property rights regime represents the main legal tool to keep part of the rent. In the last 100 years, Venezuela developed a specific fiscal regime that inspired the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an organization made it to fight for the oil rent from the supply side.

What is the problem with the oil rent? Even if the oil rent has been a historically and recurrent income for the Venezuelan economy, the uses of the oil rent rest unsolved. Indeed, the problem with the rent starts when a country, an entire economy, makes policies (both, in the oil and non-oil sectors) counting on the oil rent as if it was a stable and an inexhaustible income over time. Indeed, one of the ideological risks with the oil rent is to suppose the fiction of having that income in the future, committing the majority of the time to the country with external debt. This was the case of the origin of the external debt during the 80's and it is what is happening now.

Why the falling of oil rent is the crisis of the national economy? The crisis in an oil rent dependent economy occurs when oil prices fall below the commitments made in the national budget. If the economic system did not save funds aside for the low prices periods, if the economic system is not prepared for the fluctuations of the oil rent, a crisis ensues, whose dimensions will always have the size of the commitment acquired.
However, the current Venezuelan crisis has three additional characteristics:
· The national oil industry has suffered a significant deterioration in its productive capacity[2].
· The non-oil sector devoted to food production (dependent also on the oil rent), has suffered very serious consequences in its productive capacity.
· The inefficiency in the internal fiscal accounts and the unsustainable exchange rate parity creates profound distortions throughout the whole economy.

This also causes a drastic reduction of foreign currency and a generalized deterioration of the productive sectors, having a hyper-inflationary effect on prices

Non-productive solution for the massive economic crisis. The national government is still far from initiating a plan of economic reactivation oriented to the national production. On the contrary, the fall of the oil rent has led the government to look for other sources of rent, exacerbating the extractive condition of the economy. At present, the government is trying to recover revenues through indebtedness with a cryptocurrency called Petro, committing future barrels of oil in private hands and reversing rights obtained in 2001 with the Hydrocarbons Law. Petro will undoubtedly has a direct consequence on national sovereignty. In addition, government has created the Orinoco Mining Arc, for the exploitation of gold and other minerals, placing more than half of the southern province of Guayana at the disposal of large transnational mining corporations.

What to do with the oil rent? In Venezuela, the public discussion about the uses of the oil rent in the national development starts in 1934, and is still on going. However, the ambiguous conception of the oil rent since 1976 has prevented a consensus on the uses of oil rent, leading the economy indebtedness and to the mismanagement of the oil rent.

Building accountability for the oil rent. Oil exporting economies have to deal with the oil rent as inevitable part of its national income. The main challenge is how to build a national account system and institutional framework oriented to the accountability of this oil rent, in order to prevent the historical mismanagement that this country has witnessed.


References and Sources
-   Mommer, Bernard (1989). ¿Es posible una polĂ­tica petrolera no rentista? In Revista BCV: Caracas, Volumen 4 – No. 3 – 1989; pp. 56-107
-   Murshed, S. Mansoob (2004) ‘When Does Natural Resource Abundance Lead to a Resource Curse’, IIED-EEP Working Paper 04-01, www.iied.org
- OPEC (2018) Monthly Oil Market Report, 12th February 2018. Available in http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ 
-  Regnault, Blas (March 2018). “Synchronicity between recent transformation in liberal institutional frame in Venezuela and the new challenges of a ‘green’ global oil business”. MIMEO.


[1] Blas Regnault  is a Venezuelan Sociologist, devoted to the study of global oil price cycles and its impact on the sustainable development in oil exporting economies.
[2] According to the OPEC, the Venezuelan Oil production losses 604,000 barrels per day since 2016 (2,373 MBD 2016/ 1,769 MBD Jan 2018).

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